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Abstract 
 
This literature review discusses the possibility of the euro area facing a secular stagnation condition 
– a long-term stagnation of economic growth and a decline of the natural rate of interest. Discussions 
of the secular stagnation have arisen after the financial crisis shook the global economy. I focus on 
defining the term “secular stagnation” and studying the reasons behind it, and justify my observations 
with an Overlapping Generations model and its application by Eggertsson, Mehrotra and Robbins 
(2019). I show how all the main forces behind a secular stagnation hypothesis (a decrease in 
population growth, a fall in productivity growth and an increase in inequality) have somewhat realised 
in the euro area during the past 50 years. Therefore, it is justified to conclude that the euro area can 
be facing a secular stagnation condition and that this condition might a “new normal”. This 
observation is consistent with many economists’ current arguments.   
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1. Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the European debt crisis of 2012, there has 
been a continuous debate about whether the developed economies have survived the crises unhurt. 
Some might argue that the world has recovered well with the help of unusual monetary policies, 
which can now be left behind as the employment percentages are highest in a decade, wages are 
rising, and the governments’ debt-to-GDP ratios are shrinking (The Bank of Finland, 2019). The Fed 
has increased its interest rates after the period of near-zero rates, and the US economy seems to be 
finally heading towards a healthier state, followed by the rest of the industrial world. This optimism 
is justified, certainly, if recent statistics, strong stock markets and the end of fiscal contraction are to 
be believed. How could anyone be afraid of the economy to stop growing? Is the economic growth 
not a law of nature, happening in the long term regardless of the policy actions or any kind of crises? 
Yes, the great news in the past few years and the optimistic forecasts of US and European economies 
are true and should be celebrated. The developed economies have achieved great victories after tough 
years of recession and debt crisis. However, these victories have been achieved through very 
extraordinary monetary policy, which has never been seen in history before. Central banks’ policy 
rates have been near-zero and below for many years and the monetary easing programs have been 
widely implemented. Yes, in these conditions of ultra-low interest rates and monetary easing, the 
economy should be blooming. Thanks to the monetary policy implementations, the employment and 
growth rates are finally ascending to their pre-crisis levels. However, there is no evidence that this 
economic growth would be sustainable under normal real interest rates. The European Central Bank 
has not increased its interest rates since 2011, and the Fed’s rates are nowhere near the pre-crisis 
level. We have thus lived this period of unusual monetary policy for quite some time now and seen 
only temporary positive shocks. It seems like the healthier economic situation could not last anymore 
even though the central banks and states do everything in their power. We are, indeed, seeing very 
normal economic growth in very abnormal policy and financial conditions (Summers, 2018). 
The Fed had optimistic outlook last year, and it cautiously increased its interest rates (Federal 
Reserve, 2018), but declared once again this July that it will lower them to support the economic 
growth (Federal Reserve, 2019a). The situation is no different in the euro area: in June, the European 
Central Bank announced that it will keep its interest rates unchanged at least through the first half of 
2020 to govern the inflation towards close to 2 per cent target (European Central Bank, 2019). As 
Fed’s chairman Jerome Powell said in his press conference in June 2019, “weaker global growth may 
continue to hold inflation down around the world” (Federal Reserve, 2019b), and even the 
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unconventional monetary policy measures don’t seem to ease the situation in any time near. That is 
why we cannot ignore the possibility of the world facing a persistent, long-term condition of no 
economic growth, which is not caused by single events or short-term shocks. That is why we cannot 
help but wonder if there really is an economic condition called secular stagnation. 
Secular stagnation has been widely studied over the past years. Especially since Lawrence Summers 
wrote his pivotal column in 2013, economists and journalists have been very interested in this topic. 
Eggertsson and Mehrotra introduced their model of secular stagnation in 2014, and Eggertsson, 
Mehrotra and Robbins complemented it in 2019 with a quantitative analysis. VoxEu published a 
collection of papers, Secular Stagnation: Facts, Causes and Cures, in 2014, which included papers 
from e.g. Paul Krugman and Lawrence Summers. Interest on secular stagnation has only increased 
during the past two or three years as the public has started to realize that this condition might be in 
our future. For example, the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Finland 
have published many articles regarding an economic area facing secular stagnation, but there are only 
few studies considering specifically the euro area (e.g. The Bank of Finland, 2018). 
In this literature review, I examine the possibility of the euro area facing a secular stagnation 
condition. I start by defining the term secular stagnation, using articles and papers by Lawrence 
Summers and Alvin Hansen as my main sources. Next, I introduce the overlapping generations model 
of secular stagnation by Eggertsson, Mehrotra and Robbins (2019), which interprets how the situation 
of low interest rates is formed and what are the reasons behind it. Last, based on these results of the 
model and articles by various economists, I discuss whether the euro area might be suffering from 
secular stagnation condition. I also present some suggestions on what can be done to prevent the 
situation from worsening. Aim of this thesis is to justify why secular stagnation would be true in the 
euro area, basing my arguments on existing studies and data from the euro area economy. Based on 
this evidence, my conclusion is that the euro area might really be facing a secular stagnation condition. 
After examining the data from the euro area, it seems clear that the main characteristics of secular 
stagnation exist in the monetary union. However, I will not be providing an exhaustive answer to this 
question, as secular stagnation is not a measurable phenomenon, and it is still controversial, whether 
such term even exists. Also, I will not take a stand on monetary or fiscal policy, as this thesis is only 
meant to be ponderous. 
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2. Defining secular stagnation 
 
There is no consensus among economists that such term as secular stagnation exists in the first place. 
However, the most common definition for the term is “a prolonged period of no economic growth in 
which satisfactory growth can only be achieved through unsustainable financial conditions” 
(Eggertsson et al., 2019) – unsustainable conditions referring to current unconventional monetary 
policy measures, e.g. zero-to-negative interest rates. In a secular stagnation steady state, the natural 
real interest rate, the rate at which the employment and GDP are at their full potential, is permanently 
negative, inflation is persistently below target and output falls below trend. (Eggertsson et al., 2019). 
A natural real rate of interest exists in the equilibrium of supply and demand of loans, i.e. in the 
equilibrium of saving and investment. A demand-side perspective of the secular stagnation proposes 
that there is a persistent oversupply of savings that push down the natural real rate of interest. In other 
words, there is a chronic shortage of aggregate demand which constraints economic growth. 
Interest rates may even slide into negative territory, causing low economic growth and low inflation. 
According to normal New Keynesian theory, lower interest rates should increase loan demand and 
boost investments. With or without policy interventions, the economy should eventually restore itself 
to full employment and optimal output equilibrium. However, in the secular stagnation hypothesis, 
the aggregate demand is permanently lacking due to several chronic issues I will later discuss. 
Opposite to the popular theories, the secular stagnation hypothesis suggests that it might be 
impossible for the economy to recover under conventional monetary policy conditions. 
 
2.1. Secular stagnation according to Alvin Hansen and Lawrence Summers 
 
The term secular stagnation was originally introduced by Alvin Hansen, a Keynesian economist, in 
1939 after the Great Depression had hit the United States. As formalized by Eggertsson and Mehrotra 
(2014, p. 1), Hansen suggested that “the Great Depression might be the start of a new era of ongoing 
unemployment and economic stagnation” without any natural forces pushing the economy towards a 
healthier situation. As driving forces behind a secular stagnation condition, Hansen suggested 
fundamental factors, such as a decline in the birth rate, ageing population, a decline in productivity 
growth and increasing income inequality. All of these factors create an oversupply of savings, which 
leads to insufficient aggregate demand. (Eggertsson et al., 2019). 
Speculations about secular stagnation rose again almost 80 years after Hansen first introduced the 
term when Lawrence Summers reassessed it in 2013 in his column “Why stagnation might prove to 
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be the new normal” (Financial Times, 2013). Summers argued that the secular stagnation could be 
considered as a hypothesis that the natural rate of interest – the equilibrium of real interest rates when 
output is at its potential – is permanently negative (Eggertsson et al., 2019). Summers was one of the 
first economists to highlight the defining meaning of real interest rate decline in the secular stagnation 
hypothesis. As I will later explain, defining secular stagnation condition eventually comes down to 
the level of real interest rate, which is defined through supply and demand of loans. 
 
2.2. Modern secular stagnation 
 
In 1939, Alvin Hansen raised a worry of a new era of permanently lacking economic growth. 
Fortunately, back then, Hansen’s fears turned out to be unwarranted, since the World War II in the 
1940’s increased government spending massively. The following baby boom changed the population 
dynamics, easing the economic situation further, and the idea of secular stagnation was forgotten for 
decades. (Eggertsson et al., 2019). 
Hansen’s idea gained renewed interest almost 80 years later, after Japanese two-decade-long malaise 
and the long-lasting period of slow economic growth in the US and the euro area. These periods share 
many features with the Great Depression in the US, such as decreasing population growth and near-
zero levels of central banks’ interest rates, and thus they can be compared to the situation Alvin 
Hansen described in 1939. Lawrence Summers (2013) was considering that the US economy might 
be suffering from a persistent condition of no economic growth, against which the economy should 
prepare to insure. He raised a prospect that the 2008-2009 crisis might have ushered in the beginning 
of secular stagnation, the same way that Alvin Hansen assessed in 1939. (Eggertsson & Mehrotra, 
2014). 
Although Summers declared that the crisis of 2009 would be the start of secular stagnation, the 
interest rate decline had started already well before that. According to Eggertsson, Mehrotra and 
Robbins (2019), the western economies had faced a 25-year long trend of declining rates (Figure 1), 
but it wasn’t until Summers’ proposition that people started paying attention to it. As the Figure 1 
shows, the natural real interest rate has been declining all over the industrial world already since the 
1980s, falling rapidly in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and being near-zero or even 
negative today. 
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Figure 1: Natural real rate of interest 
 
Source: Holston, K., Laubach, T., & Williams, J. C. (2017). Measuring the natural rate of interest: International trends and determinants. Journal of 
International Economics, 108, S59-S75. 
 
Speaking of economic growth, the advanced economies have been growing ever since the financial 
crisis, except for the 2012 slump in the euro area caused by the debt crisis. However, as Figure 2 
shows, the GDP growth rate has come down from around 6 per cent to less than 2 per cent in less 
than 50 years. Economic cycles have of course always affected the growth rate, as can be seen from 
the figure, but it does not rule out the fact that the trendline is directed downwards. The euro area, 
specifically, has faced a radical decline in the growth rate since 2009 and has not been able to recover 
from the crisis as other industrial countries (Summers, 2013). Since then, the euro area has had good 
years as well, but nevertheless, the growth seems somewhat stagnant, if not even declining, in every 
economic region. 
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Figure 2: GDP growth (annual percentage) 
Source: OECD (2019): Gross domestic product (GDP): GDP, volume – annual growth rates in percentage 
 
Objectors claim that we are just heading towards another recession, which is a part of normal 
economic cycles. The global economy has seen numerous recessions, depressions and also bubbles 
and overheatings, from which it has always recovered well. Some might argue that before the 2008-
2009 financial crisis the economy was on a healthy track, growing with satisfactory rate and under 
modest inflation. There had even been great upswings like the 2001 stock market bubble, which was 
characterised by strong economic performance and full employment, but no overheating. To explain 
this outwardly good-looking pattern, Summers argued that the overheating was avoided due to the 
already existing decline in the equilibrium interest rate. According to Summers, a chronic problem 
had arisen without anyone noticing (Gimdal & Karakas, 2016). 
 
2.3. Reasons behind secular stagnation 
 
What are the factors that cause the natural rate of interest to be permanently negative? At first, there 
has to be some reason that pushes the rates towards near-zero levels in the first place. This reason can 
be found through another main property of secular stagnation: a decrease, or even a stagnation, in 
economic growth. As I will later interpret with an overlapping generations model by Eggertsson, 
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Mehrotra and Robbins (2019), these two are strongly associated. Therefore, we might as well ask 
another, slightly easier question: what are the reasons behind sluggish economic growth? 
 
2.3.1. A slowdown in population growth 
 
According to Alvin Hansen (1939), the main reason behind the sluggish economic growth is 
diminishing population growth. The decrease in global population growth in the 21st century consists 
of decreasing fertility rates, growing population of old and increasing longevity. 
As fertility rates drop, the ageing population would lead to a decrease in private investments, as the 
elderly people invest in services rather than in, for example, real estate or technology equipment. 
This, in turn, leads to slower long-term economic growth and increasing unemployment, as 
investments in services require fewer resources that investments in real estate business (Eggertsson, 
et al., 2019). Also, if the fertility rate is decreasing, there are fewer workers to hire, which means 
fewer investments by the firms (The Economist, 2015). 
As the population grows older, savings in the economy increase. The young tend to be big borrowers 
rather than savers since they don’t generate much income and expect their future income to grow so 
that it covers their current debt-taking. The older the population is, the less there is demand for loans. 
Also, older people usually consume less than younger in general, which decreases demand even more. 
(Eggertsson, et al., 2019). 
Increasing longevity lowers the consumption of the young and middle-aged since they prepare for 
longer and more uncertain retirement by saving. Increased private savings, in turn, imply a decrease 
in bequests parents leave for their children, which causes physical capital accumulation slowdown 
(Kunze, 2014). Therefore, the ageing change in demographics – especially in rich countries, where 
the fertility rate has had a declining trend – is the baseline reason for the slowdown in economic 
growth. 
 
2.3.2. New technology and a fall in productivity growth 
 
Another factor decreasing the investments is proposed to be the new technology. As technology 
develops, it leads to lower prices of capital goods and efficiency, which means that new investments 
require less capital. Today’s large technology firms, such as Google or Facebook, can grow infinitely 
on very little capital, and new, significant ventures like them require much less capital to start than 
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they used to (Summers, 2014a). Also, they have resources to move their production to countries with 
cheaper labour cost (Helsingin Sanomat, 2019). Globalization and increased competition push wages 
down, which slows down the inflation growth. Furthermore, in the past few decades, the world has 
not seen significant innovations, such as electricity or combustion engines, which had a huge impact 
on productivity and economic growth in history. Computers and the Internet may never have the same 
kind of impact on the global economy (Eichengreen, 2015). As Lawrence Summers put it, “the 
modern business requires less capital to function” (Wessel & Olson, 2015). 
Summers added the slowdown in productivity growth to the table, and a British economist Tim 
Jackson (2019) argued that labour productivity growth compared to the GDP per capita growth has 
declined. Mathematically, if the GDP per capita equals the labour productivity multiplied by 
workforce participation and the average number of hours worked, then, keeping the multipliers 
constant, the GDP per capita growth rate should always be equal to the labour productivity growth 
rate. However, the difference between these two is widening. This means that either the workforce 
participation or the average number of hours worked are increasing in the economy. Jackson claimed 
that in fact, both of these two things have happened during the last half a century. Before the Great 
Recession, work participation rates increased, allowing the GDP per capita rates to decline more 
slowly than labour productivity growth. After the Recession, the average hours worked have been 
increasing globally, which for one’s part decreases the labour productivity growth even more. This 
assumption might be contradictory with technology increasing productivity, but it is rational to say 
that modern technology might never achieve the same levels of productivity growth that, for example, 
oil or other fossil fuel technologies created. Also, a decrease in productivity growth decreases 
households’ income prospects, which once again increases saving in the economy (Eggertsson et al., 
2019). 
 
2.3.3. Rising inequality 
 
The fourth reason behind the secular stagnation condition is rising inequality, especially in the 
developed industrial countries. As an increasing share of income is held by the wealthiest with low 
marginal propensity to consume, the consumption diminishes (Summers, 2013): higher-income 
households tend to have higher saving rates than low- and middle-income households. Hence, the rise 
in the income inequality creates a shortfall in the aggregate demand. In normal economic condition, 
lacking consumer spending is offset by increased investment, since higher savings put downward 
pressure on interest rates. However, in secular stagnation condition where the interest rates have fallen 
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to ultra-low levels, the zero lower bound might be blocking higher investment spending (Bivens, 
2017). 
 
3. Zero Lower Bound 
 
Interest rates have been low before, only to rise again along with economic cycles. How is it that this 
time they might not rise again? Lawrence Summers declared this through interest rate flexibility. In 
a normal economic situation, as a negative shock takes place, private savings increase, and 
investments decline. Either market forces or policy actions make the interest rates fall to equate the 
full employment equilibrium of savings and investments, the equilibrium at which output is at its 
potential and inflation is stable. In other words, any change in savings or investments affect the real 
interest rate, but not output or employment. However, this requires that interest rates are fully flexible 
and can be anything below or above zero. In modern economies, the interest rates cannot fall below 
zero because of a zero lower bound (ZLB), a situation where lowering rates would not encourage 
spending, but instead, it only makes people hold cash. Therefore, central banks can no longer 
stimulate the economy via interest rate policies, and the interest rates might not be low enough to 
meet the saving and investment equilibrium at the full employment level of output. Ordinary 
monetary policy measures are no more feasible, and the secular stagnation condition continues. 
(Summers, 2014b). 
Even if the zero lower bound is not binding, low interest rates would create financial stability 
problems, as they increase risk taking and promote irresponsible lending. This is something like what 
happened before the financial crisis. Therefore, as the real interest rates have had a declining trend 
for a longer period now (Figure 1), it might not be possible to lower them further. In practice, as 
Lawrence Summers once said, the atmosphere of zero or even negative interest rates might indeed be 
the ‘new normal’. (Summers, 2013). 
All the above reasons eventually come to the equilibrium of saving and investment in the economy. 
Ageing population pulls savings up, whereas slow productivity growth and rising inequality affect 
the investments negatively. As they both change this way, they bring the natural rate of interest lower. 
However, as historical evidence has shown, these are only a few of the many possible factors that put 
downward pressure on the interest rates: generally, any force that affects the supply of savings and 
investment can have an effect on interest rates, many of which are too complicated to go through in 
this thesis. Therefore, Eggertson, Mehrotra and Robbins (2019) illustrated via an overlapping 
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generation (OLG) model, how these main forces – a slowdown in population growth, a fall in the 
relative price of investment goods, a slowdown in productivity growth and rising income inequality 
– play an important role in the secular stagnation hypothesis. 
 
4. The Overlapping Generations model 
 
4.1. Introduction to the model 
 
As with most economic equilibriums, the real interest rate equilibrium is also determined in the 
intersection of supply and demand. In the case of interest rates, the equilibrium is formed by the 
supply and demand for loans, i.e. savings and investments in the economy. Of course, this is the 
simplest way to illustrate this situation, since the real interest rate, like the output gap, for example, 
cannot be observed directly. 
Eggertsson, Mehrotra and Robbins (2019) formalize Summers’ idea of permanently negative real 
interest rates with a simple overlapping generation (OLG) model. In the next chapter, I will introduce 
the simple version of the model. The OLG model was first introduced by Maurice Allais in 1947 and 
it has later been widely cited in economics literature. The simple OLG model applied into secular 
stagnation hypothesis illustrates the reasons behind the low natural rate of interest and a secular 
stagnation condition, and how the rates might need on average to maintain negative to achieve full 
employment. Thus, the model illustrates the “new normal”, a world in which the real interest rates 
are permanently negative. 
The model includes three generations: the young, the middle-aged and the old. Households live for 
these three periods and die after period 3 (old). No aggregate saving is feasible (that is, there is no 
physical capital), but these generations can borrow from one another. Moreover, only middle-aged 
and old generations can generate income 𝑌𝑡
𝑚 and 𝑌𝑡
𝑜. The young cannot work, i.e. they will borrow 
from the middle-aged but can’t generate income themselves. The middle-aged, in turn, will save for 
the retirement, when they will fully consume any income they have generated, borrowed or saved. 
For simplicity, the model assumes that there is a constraint for the amount the young can borrow, 
which will be in the form of an exogenous time-varying constant 𝐷𝑡. 
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4.2. The model 
 
A household is born at time t. Consider that this household maximizes the following utility function: 
max
𝐶𝑡
𝑦
, 𝐶𝑡+1
𝑚 ,𝐶𝑡+2
𝑜
𝐸{log(𝐶𝑡
𝑦) + 𝛽 log(𝐶𝑡+1
𝑚 ) + 𝛽2log (𝐶𝑡+2
𝑜 )} , 
where 𝐶𝑡
𝑦
 is the consumption of the household when young, 𝐶𝑡+1
𝑚  is the consumption of the household 
when middle-aged, and 𝐶𝑡+2
𝑜  is its consumption when old. Assume that all the lending and borrowing 
happen via riskless bonds denoted as 𝐵𝑡
𝑖, where i = y, m, o at an interest rate 𝑟𝑡. Given these 
assumptions, the household faces the following budget constraints at each period: 
 
(1)                                                         𝐶𝑡
𝑦 =  𝐵𝑡
𝑦
, 
(2)                                                       𝐶𝑡+1
𝑚 =  𝑌𝑡+1
𝑚 − (1 + 𝑟𝑡)𝐵𝑡
𝑦 + 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑚 , 
(3)                                                       𝐶𝑡+2
𝑜 =  𝑌𝑡+2
𝑜 − (1 + 𝑟𝑡+1)𝐵𝑡+1
𝑚 , 
(4)                                             (1 + 𝑟𝑡)𝐵𝑡
𝑖 ≤  𝐷𝑡, 
where equation (1) is the budget constraint for the young, where the consumption is fully financed by 
borrowing. Equation (2) is the budget constraint for the middle-aged, where income 𝑌𝑡
𝑚 is received, 
borrowings are repaid, and new assets 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑚  are borrowed. Thus, the middle-aged save −𝐵𝑡+1
𝑚  for 
retirement. Equation (3) is the budget constraint for when the household is old, consuming savings, 
interest, and everything that is left from the previous periods. The last equation (4) is the inequality 
equation, which corresponds to the exogenous borrowing limit we earlier referred to: 
 
(5)                                                        𝐶𝑡
𝑦 =  𝐵𝑡
𝑦 =
𝐷𝑡
1+𝑟𝑡
. 
The equation (5) implies that the young can only borrow the amount of debt they are able to repay in 
the middle period, and therefore, it includes interest payments. Thus, a decline in the real interest rate 
𝑟𝑡 increases the borrowing by the young. 
The middle-aged are at an interior solution, and their consumption-saving choices satisfy the standard 
Euler equation 
(6)                                                       
1
𝐶𝑡
𝑚 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡
1+𝑟𝑡
𝐶𝑡+1
𝑜 . 
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Finally, the old will consume their income: 
(7)                                                      𝐶𝑡
𝑜 =  𝑌𝑡
𝑜 − (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝐵𝑡−1
𝑚 . 
 
If the generation growth rate is defined by 
𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝑡−1
= 1 + 𝑔𝑡, and if the borrowing of the young equals 
the savings of the middle-aged – the equilibrium is formed in the bond market – then the equation is 
as follows: 
(8)                                                 (1 + 𝑔𝑡)𝐵𝑡
𝑦 = −𝐵𝑡
𝑚. 
The savings of the middle-aged correspond to the loan supply in the economy, which therefore forms 
the borrowing constraint for the young. 
Next, the model analyses the equilibrium determination using the market equilibrium for savings and 
loans given by equation (6). Here, we use notations 𝐿𝑡
𝑑 for investments, i.e. loan demand, and 𝐿𝑡
𝑠 for 
savings, i.e. loan supply. The demand for loans has the exogenous constraint (1 + 𝑟𝑡)𝐵𝑡
𝑖 ≤  𝐷𝑡, and 
it cannot exceed the savings of the middle-aged. Hence, using equation (6) and the inequality equation 
(5), the demand for loans can be written as 
(9)                                                  𝐿𝑡
𝑑 = (1 + 𝑔𝑡)𝐵𝑡
𝑦 =
(1+𝑔𝑡)
1+𝑟𝑡
𝐷𝑡, 
while the expression for loan supply can be derived as 
(10)                                              𝐿𝑡
𝑠 =
𝛽
1+𝛽
(𝑌𝑡
𝑚 − 𝐷𝑡−1) −
1
1+𝛽
𝑌𝑡+1
𝑜
1+𝑟𝑡
 
by combining the household budget constraints and the middle generation Euler equation. 
As a result, the real interest rate is determined in the intersection of the loan demand 𝐿𝑡
𝑑 and loan 
supply 𝐿𝑡
𝑠: 
(11)                                            1 + 𝑟𝑡 =
1+𝛽
𝛽
(1+𝑔𝑡)𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡
𝑚−𝐷𝑡−1
+
1
𝛽
𝑌𝑡+1
𝑜
𝑌𝑡
𝑚−𝐷𝑡−1
 
described in Figure 3 below: 
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Figure 3: Equilibrium of loan demand and supply 
Source: Eggertsson, G. B., Mehrotra, N. R., & Robbins, J. A. (2019). A model of secular stagnation: Theory and quantitative evaluation. American 
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 11(1), 1-48, p. 10. 
 
The equation (11) shows us that the real interest rate depends, in addition to the discount factor, on 
income over time, debt limit and population growth. This is compatible with Hansen’s and Summers’ 
propositions to the reasons behind low interest rates. 
Let us compare the model to the reasons we introduced in section 2: a slowdown in population growth, 
a fall in productivity growth and rising income inequality. The effect of a decline in population growth 
can be seen from the equation for loan demand: as the number or the young population, i.e. population 
growth 𝑔𝑡 decreases, so does the demand for loans. This shifts the 𝐿𝑡
𝑑 curve to the left lowering the 
real interest rate to the equilibrium B in Figure 3. 
In addition to population growth, the change in demographics also affects the real interest rate 
equilibrium. Decreasing mortality risk and ageing population require more savings for retirement, 
which shifts out the loan supply, moving the 𝐿𝑡
𝑠 curve to the right. 
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In their quantitative extension of the simple OLG model, Eggertsson et al. analyse contributions of 
these fundamental factors. Their examinations show that a decrease in the total fertility rate from 
1970 to 2015 had a – 1.84 per cent effect on the natural rate of interest. Accordingly, a decrease in 
the mortality rate had a – 1.82 per cent effect on the interest rate. These factors play the largest role 
in the decline of the natural rate of interest together with a decrease in productivity growth, which 
leads to a – 1.90 per cent change in the natural rate of interest. 
A fall in the productivity growth, on the other hand, leads to lower expected income in the future, 
which means that the middle-aged will increase their savings for retirement, shifting the 𝐿𝑡
𝑠 curve to 
the right. Moreover, if the debt limit of the young is equal to the extent to which the middle-aged can 
repay their debt, the more the middle-aged save, the less there is left for the young to borrow. As a 
result, the borrowing constraint for the young tightens, shifting the 𝐿𝑡
𝑑 curve backwards to the left. 
Now the economy is in the equilibrium C in Figure 3. 
Considering rising income inequality, the loan supply-demand figure shows us how shifting income 
from the credit-constrained households (the borrowers) to the middle-aged (the savers) shifts the 𝐿𝑡
𝑠 
curve to the right, lowering the real interest rate. However, this assumption requires that the wealthy 
save more than the deprived. 
A fourth aspect often associated with the secular stagnation, to which Lawrence Summers has also 
referred, is a fall in the relative price of goods. As investment goods become cheaper, less capital is 
needed to finance a given level of investment, and the aggregate demand for investment decreases, 
shifting the Lt
d curve to the left. 
The simple OLG model shows how the fundamental factors behind the secular stagnation push the 
real interest rate down. Next, Eggertsson, Mehrotra and Robbins explain why the output and inflation 
are permanently at low levels in secular stagnation steady state. 
 
4.3. The secular stagnation steady state 
 
After representing the simple OLG model, Eggertsson, Mehrotra and Robbins (2019) illustrate the 
secular stagnation equilibrium through an adaptation of long-term AD/AS model (Figure 4). Just like 
the simple OLG model, the AD/AS model interprets the secular stagnation equilibrium through the 
demand and supply of loans. The model shows the connection between the real interest rate and 
inflation and output. This AD/AS model adaptation interprets a situation where a deleveraging 
(savings increasing) shock emerges, creating an oversupply of savings. 
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Figure 4. Steady-state AD/AS curves * 
 
*Axes show the shares of potential. 
Source: Eggertsson, G. B., Mehrotra, N. R., & Robbins, J. A. (2019). A model of secular stagnation: Theory and quantitative evaluation. American 
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 11(1), 1-48, p. 16. 
 
According to established economic assumptions, if inflation is permanently at very high levels, the 
inflation expectations automatically adjust so that optimal employment is achieved in the long run 
despite the level of inflation. Thus, the aggregate supply curve is vertical at high levels of inflation 
(the upper half of the aggregate supply curve in Figure 4). On the other hand, at lower levels of 
inflation, there is a trade-off between inflation and unemployment (the bottom half of the aggregate 
supply curve in Figure 4): according to Tobin (1972), firms tend to be reluctant to cut nominal wages 
despite high unemployment, which creates long-term unemployment. 
After a negative shock occurs, the real interest rate falls into negative territory and inflation drops 
below target, and therefore the young cannot borrow as much as they used to finance their current 
consumption – as illustrated, the lower the real interest rate is, the less the middle-aged save and the 
lower the borrowing constraint 𝐷 for the young is. The decrease in borrowing implies a direct fall in 
output since the consumption in the economy decreases (Cuerpo et al., 2013). In normal, positive real 
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interest rate regime, the equilibrium would be in the intersection of the aggregate supply curve and 
AD1 curve, where both output and inflation are at their potential. The drop in spending would lead to 
a drop in the real interest rate, which in turn would restore spending back to its previous level. 
However, in the environment of already ultra-low real interest rate, the zero lower bound prevents 
this from happening, and the spending is permanently lower, shifting aggregate demand curve 
permanently to the left (AD2). This equilibrium is marked as the Deflation steady state in Figure 4, 
which is also the stagnation steady state. Here, the nominal interest rate is zero, inflation even lower 
than before and an output gap exists. 
Since the currently existing forces that are pushing the interest rates down, such as the change in 
demographics, are long-term rather than temporary and do not vary very fast, there are little signs of 
the economy recovering back to the full employment equilibrium any time soon. The AD/AS model 
above illustrates the exact same phenomenon as the simple OLG model: an oversupply of savings 
over investments pushes the real interest rate negative and leads to a stagnation steady state. 
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5. Secular stagnation in the euro area 
 
To conclude whether the euro area might be suffering from secular stagnation, one must look at the 
development of the main characteristics of the condition. To suffer from secular stagnation, the euro 
area should be experiencing a longer-term decline in the natural real rate of interest, GDP growth, 
and inflation. Also, the reasons behind these changes should follow the results in the OLG model: 
saving in the economy should be increasing, while investment should be heading towards another 
direction. I will also go through the main forces behind this condition – a slowdown in population 
growth, a fall in the relative price of investment goods, a slowdown in productivity growth and rising 
income inequality – , how they have changed in the euro area, and are the changes significant enough 
to prove that there might be a possibility for a secular stagnation condition. 
 
5.1. Japan as an epitome 
 
Like most developed countries, the euro area hasn’t been able to recover from the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis. Some economists say that the euro area situation resembles much the situation in Japan: since 
the 1990s, Japan has suffered from a long-lasting period of lacking growth and low levels of the 
natural rate of interest. This phenomenon is so extraordinary that it even has its own term called 
“Japanization”. This reference is not completely imagination since the euro area does have many 
characteristics like Japan: ultra-low natural rate of interest, negative central bank policy rates and 
lacking economic growth. Also, both periods started when a financial bubble burst, and have been 
ongoing since. As in the euro area, in Japan, the working-age population has started to decrease, and 
life expectancy increase already well before the crisis. In fact, in Japan, the population growth has 
already seen its high and has been on a decline for seven years. According to the Eurostat, (2017), in 
the euro area, the peak is expected to be reached in 2045, which means that the euro area is following 
Japan’s demographic path (Look, 2019). 
Although the patterns in these two monetary areas do seem alike, the euro area has succeeded better 
in a few ways. First, the ECB was quick enough to react to the economic slowdown and cut its policy 
rates soon after the slowdown started. Bank of Japan, on the other hand, brought its policy rates down 
almost five years after the slowdown had started (Ueda, 2012), and by then it was already too late: a 
deflation had started in the island country, which made it more difficult for the policy measures to 
work adequately. Second, the euro area GDP growth has remained somewhat stagnant for the past 
ten years, whereas in Japan the growth rates are lower and lower, being near-zero in 2018 (World 
Bank Group, 2019). Third, the productivity growth slowdown, which is one of the reasons behind 
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secular stagnation, has been worse in Japan than in the euro area. In fact, the productivity growth rate 
in Japan dived to the level of -1.4 % in 2018 (The Conference Board, 2019), and this is the lowest 
point the country has faced in ten years. Hence, although the euro area does look like Japan since the 
1990s, there is no reason to be worried that the euro area would be facing the future of “Japanization”. 
For now, the monetary union has survived moderately, and the outlook does not look as dark as in 
Japan. 
 
5.2. Evidence from the euro area 
 
The natural real rate of interest in the euro area has declined for decades, already since the 1970s 
(Figure 5). The most rapid decline occurred in the aftermath of the financial crisis. However, the 
interest rate decline is a long-term phenomenon begun well before the financial crisis, and thus the 
decline cannot be accused of being caused only by the crisis. The interest rate trend is perfectly in 
line with that of the GDP growth, which implies a longer-term chronic problem in the economy long 
before the crises occurred. 
 
Figure 5: Euro area natural rate of interest 
 
Source: Holston, K., Laubach, T., & Williams, J. C. (2017). Measuring the natural rate of interest: International trends and determinants. Journal of 
International Economics, 108, S59-S75. 
 
-1,0
-0,5
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
4,0
19 
 
The GDP per capita growth is not on its pre-crisis path either, despite the hard work and good news 
the public has shared in the past few years. Actually, the growth rate of the euro area’s GDP per capita 
has declined already since the early 1970s, according to economist Leon Podkaminer (2015): the 
annual GDP growth rates have diminished from 5.47 % in 1970 to 1.90 % in 2018 (Figure 6), and if 
you look at the data even further, you can see the diminishing trend going on even from the early 
1960s. 
Figure 6: Euro area GDP growth (annual percentage) 
  
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2019). GDP growth (annual %).  
 
After the 2009 financial crisis, the GDP had a sharp increase before it dived again due to the debt 
crisis. After these crises, there has been ups and downs, but the trend seems stagnant and the 
projections don’t seem to differ from the trend: according to the latest macroeconomic projections by 
the ECB (2019), the real annual GDP growth stays at 1.4 % until 2021, which is far from its pre-crisis 
levels. 
The OEDC outlook (2019) is not any better. Economic growth in the euro area has slowed down since 
2018, due to weak external demand and low business confidence. If one adds the current fear of the 
trade war to the equation, savings are increasing even further, and private investments are weighted 
down. Projections of the future growth are consistent with the ECB: GDP growth remains below 
1.5 %. Private consumption increase and employment growth are expected to modestly support the 
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GDP growth, but even these factors are not enough to boost investments to the levels of equilibrium 
rate above zero. Seems like euro are GDP growth is at these 2014-2015 levels for years to come. 
One of the main assumptions in the secular stagnation hypothesis is that the natural rate of interest is 
so low that saving and investment equilibrium does not meet at the level of full employment and 
potential output. However, looking at the latest data (Figure 7), it seems like the euro area is catching 
up the output gap, which formed after the financial crisis, and GDP is rising back to its potential. 
Does this mean that the euro area is recovering to its pre-crisis levels? Not quite, since the gap is only 
narrowing thanks to unconventional monetary policy measures and ultra-low interest rates. There is 
no evidence that such a trend would be sustainable under normal economic conditions. Also, short-
term upswings can occur even under secular stagnation condition, since it is focused on longer term. 
What comes to the output gap measurement, the potential output is repeatedly corrected to correspond 
better to the evolution of actual GDP. 2018 potential output estimate is much closer to the actual 
output than the 2007 estimate. Hence, even the closure in the output gap does not imply a return to 
the pre-crisis path (Bank of Finland, 2018). 
 
Figure 7: Euro area output gap (percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: OECD (2018), "OECD Economic Outlook No. 104 (Edition 2018/2)" 
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A trend similar to the GDP growth can be seen in the inflation rates as well (Figure 8). During 1960-
2018, inflation measured in the consumer price index in the euro area has declined even to zero levels 
in 2015, and the ECB’s 2 per cent goal has been out of reach since 2012. The ECB predicts a moderate 
increase in the inflation rate for the next two years (1.6 % in 2021), but it still does not achieve the 
inflation goal level set by the central bank. Also, this announcement could be part of ECB’s forward 
guidance policies: higher inflation expectations tend to result in higher consumption by lowering 
consumers’ incentives to save, and therefore increase prices and eventually wages. 
 
Figure 8: Euro area inflation (consumer prices, annual percentage) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2019). Inflation, consumer prices (annual %). 
 
After the financial crisis of 2009, the savings rate in the euro area declined rapidly (Figure 9). A fall 
in the income made households use their savings for food and other goods, services and paying off 
debt. Most people couldn’t afford to save for the future, but instead, they had to live from hand to 
mouth. In the years after the crisis, people’s trust in the economy rose, and they braved to increase 
their consumption, which further kept the savings rate levels moderate. However, in the past few 
years, uncertainty towards the economy has once again increased (European Central Bank, 2019). 
Under uncertain economic conditions, households will start saving for the future, as future income is 
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the future (Badarau, Huart and Sangare, 2014). In the euro area, the increasing uncertainty can be 
seen as an increasing trend in the net saving ratio since 2017. Net saving ratio is calculated as 
disposable income minus final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Net saving is 
correspondent to the saving net of depreciation (OECD, 2019). The OECD forecasts the growth in 
the household savings to remain in the same trend at least until 2020, which, according to secular 
stagnation theories, implies a fall in real interest rate equilibrium. 
 
Figure 9: Euro area net saving ratio of households and non-profit institutions serving households 
(percentage of GDP) 
 Source: OECD (2019), "OECD Economic Outlook No. 105 (Edition 2019/1)" 
 
In contrast to the net saving ratio, the household consumption expenditure has declined for decades 
and is now at approximately 53.4 % of GDP (Figure 10). Consumption had a rapid decline after the 
euro crisis in 2012, and it can be assumed that increasing uncertainty affected people’s propensity to 
consume negatively. This observation is well in line with the saving ratio trend: as savings in the 
economy increase, consumption decreases, however, the shift in consumption happened much earlier. 
Even though consumption should follow savings in the economy, this is possible because after the 
financial crisis households could not afford to increase savings, but spending started to decrease 
immediately. Today, households are increasing their saving to prepare themselves for an uncertain 
future. 
4,0
5,0
6,0
7,0
8,0
9,0
10,0
11,0
12,0
13,0
23 
 
Figure 10: Euro area final consumption expenditure of households and non-profit institutions serving 
households (percentage of GDP) 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2019). Households and NPISHs final consumption expenditure (% of GDP). 
 
When considering whether the euro area might be suffering from secular stagnation, at least the main 
characteristics of the condition seem to exist in the monetary union. The natural rate of interest has 
been low for years, GDP growth is stagnant, and the outlook shows a similar pattern. Inflation is also 
expected to follow its path of below-target rates, household saving is increasing and spending 
decreasing. Majority of these trends have been ongoing for decades, as well as are the reasons behind 
them. 
 
5.3. A slowdown in population growth 
 
Supporting the reasons behind secular stagnation condition, there is evidence of decreasing 
population growth in the Euro area. According to the World Bank’s latest data (2019), there has been 
a declining trend in population growth since 1960 (Figure 11). The population growth in the whole 
world is decreasing even further in the next decades, and some sources say it might reach its peak and 
start falling by the end of the 21st century (The Economist, 2019). This is most likely due to girls’ 
education, which is still in progress in developing countries, such as Nigeria or other Central African 
countries, and is likely to cause a decrease in global fertility. In Europe, on the other hand, the 
education equality between genders has been saturated for decades, which plays a role in declining 
birth rate trend and prospects in the euro area (The United Nations, 2019). 
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Figure 11: Euro area population growth (annual percentage) 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2019). Population growth (annual %). 
 
Another proof of the changing demographics in the euro area can be seen in the development of the 
young population compared to the working-aged (ages 15-64). Along with the decreasing birth rate, 
the life expectancy has risen (Figure 13) expanding the ratio of over 65-year-olds compared to the 
working-age population above the ratio of 0-14-year-olds (Figure 12). These two lines encountered 
already in 2001, after which the population of old has only grown larger, whereas the number of 
children remains approximately unchanged (The United Nations, 2019). This has a huge impact on 
increasing savings in the economy as well as labour market: a decrease in the population growth and 
birth rate illustrated in Figures 12 and 13 imply that there are fewer people to hire in the future. Since 
the slowdown in population growth started already in the 1960s, the working-age population today is 
a lot smaller than it was a few decades ago. 
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Figure 12: Euro area age dependency ratio (percentage of working-age population) 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2019). 
Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population) & Age dependency ratio, young (% of working-age population).  
 
Increasing longevity (Figure 13, right axis) has a negative impact on economic growth when starting 
from a high level (Kelley and Schmidt, 2005). This is the case in Europe, where economies are well 
developed, and GDP per capita levels are relatively high. Therefore, it is justified to argue that 
increased life expectancy, especially in the euro area, has affected the monetary union’s economic 
growth negatively: as formalized in section 2, increased life expectancy increases the savings rate in 
the economy. 
 
Figure 13: Euro area birth rate (per 1,000 people) and life expectancy at birth (total years) 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2019). 
Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 people) & Life expectancy at birth, total (years). 
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5.4. A fall in productivity growth 
 
As seen in the data below (Figure 14), the euro area has faced lagging productivity growth compared 
to other advanced economies. Measured by output per person employed, the after-crisis performance 
has been weak both by historical and international standards. The weak productivity performance 
isn’t only due to global economic conditions, but the trend has been ongoing well before the recent 
global slowdown:  from the early 1990s, the euro area has been one of the slowest growing regions 
in terms of labour productivity (European Central Bank, 2017). Although there have been some 
positive signs in the productivity growth in the past few years, these levels are still not on the pre-
crisis path, not to mention the levels of the United States or the OECD members. 
 
Figure 14: Euro area labour productivity growth (per person employed, annual percentage) 
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database™ (Adjusted version) (Apr 2019). Growth of labor productivity per person employed, 
% change. 
 
In historical context, one might expect that a shift towards services-focused economy would be the 
natural force pushing productivity growth rates down, as service sectors have typically had lower 
productivity growth than for example industrial ones. However, according to the ECB Bulletin article 
(2017), the decline in productivity growth in the euro area has been mainly caused by a market 
slowdown across all sectors, rather than compositional effects. This observation is well in line with 
the observed secular decline in economic growth and decreased household spending. 
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Of course, the 2008 financial crisis plays a significant role in the productivity growth fall globally as 
well as in the euro area. The weakening of domestic demand and investment may have limited 
technological innovations and slowed down the expansion of small and young, but productive, firms 
(European Central Bank, 2017). Productivity growth is expected to remain moderate across the world, 
and in the euro area, large economies such as Italy and Spain are weighting the development down 
even more. In 2018, productivity gaps in these countries were up to – 25 % compared to the US (The 
Conference Board, 2019). Furthermore, if households continue to have low expectations about future 
productivity growth, it increases saving in the economy, which in turn puts downward pressure on 
the real interest rates. 
 
5.5. Rising inequality 
 
In 2014, a French economist Thomas Piketty proposed an argument that the decreasing economic 
growth was the reason behind growing income inequality in the euro area (Jackson, 2019). Piketty 
argued that under rising economic growth conditions, the richest would consume more and the wealth 
would flow back to the society. Accordingly, the poor would find employment easier, causing the 
labour productivity to increase, production costs to decline and wages to rise. In fact, between 1946 
and 1980, the poorest were the ones to gain the highest income growth, and the inequality was 
declining. 
After 1980, the income share gap started widening. Decreasing labour productivity growth might 
have affected the wage increases negatively, which affects especially the low-income part of the 
population. Also, new technology firms accrue a larger share of capital, at the same time operating 
with less and less labour force – following a rising share of income held by the high-tech companies 
and their owners. (Jackson, 2019). 
In the euro area, income inequality has had an increasing trend over ten years, as can be seen from 
Figure 15. From 2005 to 2016, the share of disposable income received by the wealthiest 20% 
compared to that received by the deprived 20 % rose from 4.7 % to 5.2 %. The same trend has been 
in other advanced economies as well. Globalization, labour force mobility and migration are proposed 
to increase the number of low-skilled workers inside Europe, and as the new technologies have been 
increasing the demand for skills, a growing share of labour force falls to the low-income share of the 
population. Consequently, high-tech companies in developed countries tend to outsource their 
production in cheap labour cost countries, which widens the domestic equality gap further. 
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Beneficiaries are the educated workers performing abstract tasks, while low-skilled workers 
performing manual tasks are losing. 
 
Figure 15: Euro area income quintile share ratio (S80/S20) * 
 
*The ratio of total disposable income received by the 20 % of the population with the highest income to that received by 
the 20 % of the population with the lowest income. 
Source: Eurostat (2019). S80/S20 income quintile share ratio by sex and selected age group - EU-SILC and ECHP surveys. 
 
Considering the euro area as one region, the inequality problem is larger than within one country, as 
it exists also between countries. Latvia, for example, is suffering from an average wage of three 
times lower than the hourly wage across the EU. Therefore, young Latvians seem to seek for better 
jobs through migration leaving Latvian labour market less competitive. Countries receiving labour 
force immigrants win compared to those losing them (Eurofound, 2017). Also, there is a difference 
whether inequality is measured by pre-tax income or after-tax income. After-tax income inequality 
is smaller in the euro area since progressive taxation is popular across the monetary union member 
states. 
Although inequality has slightly increased in the euro area since the 1980s, it is still in good condition 
compared to the US: European social models providing relatively equal access to education, health 
care, and social security function better than the ones in the US. Also, European countries have 
succeeded better in increasing the bottom earners’ income. Political decisions play a large role in 
rising inequality risk, and some countries have reduced their top marginal income tax rates as well as 
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corporate tax rates. (Blanchet, Chancel and Gethin, 2019). This could be a start of growing inequality 
if the politicians are not careful. However, it is quite safe to say that when it comes to secular 
stagnation in the euro area, rising income inequality is not affecting as much as other factors. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Considering the proposed evidence above, it is certainly rational to say that the euro area is in a 
prolonged period of stagnated growth and low interest rates. The OLG-model shows that the factors 
behind secular stagnation are most likely fundamental and that demographic structure is affecting the 
aggregate demand, which is pushing the interest rates down. These factors and trendline 
developments are easy to catch looking at the euro area data from past decades, and that is why it is 
justified to say that there might be a condition of secular stagnation in the euro area. 
Although an optimist might say that there have been several upswings in recent history or that last 
two years have shown signs of recovery, it does not rule out the fact that the declining trend in 
economic growth and interest rate have been ongoing for decades. First, secular stagnation does not 
rule out the possibility of upswings or expansions – on the contrary, it is likely to fuel expansions to 
bubbles, since ultra-low interest rates encourage risk-taking and search for yield. Second, the recent 
recovery of the euro area economy is mostly thanks to extremely abnormal monetary policy decisions, 
and it is unlikely to the economy to remain self-sustained if the ECB were to normalize its monetary 
policy. For these reasons, it might be difficult to spot the signs of weakening growth or to admit that 
economic growth is not an infinite phenomenon. The era of economic growth might indeed be at the 
end of its road in the euro area as well, and the environment of negative interest rates and stagnant 
growth might be our new future. 
However, it is controversial whether the secular stagnation really exists, since economic growth is 
not at zero-levels. The economy is growing still, although not at the same pace as it used to. When it 
comes to the fears of the euro area facing “Japanization”, our situation does not look as bad as in the 
island country: Japan has experienced a long period of deflation, whereas the euro area still enjoys 
inflation rates quite near the target. Also, if we are in the secular stagnation condition, it does not 
mean that we will stay there forever. Secular stagnation is only a long period which might very well 
end and turn towards a healthier situation. 
Whether this situation turns out good or bad for the monetary union, there is no question that this last 
decade has been very unconventional. Due to the controversial definition of the secular stagnation 
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hypothesis, we might never be totally certain that such period even existed. The global economy 
might dive into an even deeper recession, and this period of at least moderate economic growth will 
be looked back longing. On the other hand, we might find ourselves in a situation where Lawrence 
Summers’ prediction indeed came true, and this extraordinary period we now call the “secular 
stagnation” is actually the new normal. 
7. Suggestions 
 
Even if it were true that the euro area is indeed in a secular stagnation condition, that does not 
necessarily mean that there is nothing we can do. In fact, what the ECB could do is increase its 
inflation target to accommodate the negative natural rate of interest: in an environment of negative 
natural rate of interest, even unconventional monetary policy measures are not feasible. In such 
situation, raising the inflation target would bypass the nominal zero lower bound by reducing the 
inflation-adjusted rates (Bunker, 2018). This would improve macroeconomic performance and bring 
output closer to its potential (Dorich, Labelle, Lepetyuk & Mendes, 2017). 
One solution is suggested to be getting rid of cash. If the zero lower bound exists because people start 
using cash in a negative interest rate environment, then, abandoning cash and, for example, moving 
completely into cryptocurrencies would overcome the zero lower bound problem. People would no 
longer have the opportunity to hoard cash, and the ECB would have no constraints on lowering its 
policy rates. 
Yet, fiscal policy changes would have the greatest effect. Simulative fiscal policy, i.e. increasing 
budget deficits, would increase demand for loans, and thus increase the natural rate of interest. 
Eggertsson, Mehrotra and Robbins (2019) suggest that the government debt could be directed to the 
young to stimulate spending. Also, acts to improve unemployment insurance would help narrow the 
income inequality gap. However, in the euro area, actions of one country would not help the whole 
monetary union. Wider, more coherent actions are needed to boost the economic region. 
Even though these suggestions might be good in theory, they are still very inconvenient and hard to 
implement. If it were possible to move into using cryptocurrencies just like that, central banks would 
have done it ages ago. For now, the best way of fighting against secular stagnation seems to be very 
excessive monetary policy and longer-term monetary easing, which the European Central Bank has 
practiced for several years. Although the outlook for the euro area does not look bright, the ECB is 
doing everything in its power to save the economy from falling even deeper.
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